Klaus Emil Julius Fuchs: 29/12/1911 – 28/01/1988   Leave a comment

Klaus Emil Julius Fuchs: 29/12/1911 – 28/01/1988

Η Αμερικανική Ατομική Βόμβα θα μπορούσε να κατασκευαστεί και χωρίς αυτόν.

Η Σοβιετική Όχι.

Αυτή η διατύπωση που διάβασα στο ένθετο του Αρτέμη Ψαρομηλιγκου είναι απόλυτα σωστή και δείχνει και το μέγεθος του ιστορικού «παιχνιδιού».

Το ζήτημα της ασφάλειας, ιδίως σε τεχνολογίες που έρχονται στην «σκηνή» για πρώτη φορά, όπως: the First Atom Bomb, είναι πάντα ζωτικής σημασίας, διότι αυτές οι τεχνολογίες αλλάζουν τα δεδομένα. Κυριολεκτικά τα αλλάζουν.

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Το 1949, 29 Αύγουστου, έγινε η πρώτη δοκιμή της Σοβιετικής Ατομικής Βόμβας.

Τέσσερα χρόνια αργότερα από τις 16 Ιούλιου του 1945 που έγινε το τεστ Trinity, η πρώτη επιτυχημένη έκρηξη Ατομικής Βόμβας από τους Αμερικανούς.

Οι Αμερικανοί πίστευαν ότι η Σοβιετική Ένωση, θα έφτιαχνε την δική της Ατομική Βόμβα στα μέσα της δεκαετίας του 50.

Λογάριαζαν χωρίς τα κενά ασφαλείας που είχαν στο σύστημα τους.

Χωρίς την βοήθεια κατασκόπων, η Σοβιετική Ένωση θα αργούσε αρκετά να φτιάξει Ατομική Βόμβα και όταν θα την έφτιαχνε, η Αμερική θα ήταν πολύ μπροστά τεχνολογικά.

Αυτό φυσικά θα έπαιζε τεράστιο ρόλο στα Γεωστρατιγικα Παιχνίδια δύναμης στον Πλανήτη.

Οι Αμερικανοί έχασαν ένα μεγάλο πλεονέκτημα, γιατί ήταν βλάκες αυτοί που έπαιρναν τις αποφάσεις. Δε μπόρεσαν να διαχειριστούν την γνώση. Το FBI τα έκανε σκατα.

Πόσες φορές μέσα σε έναν αιώνα, θα σου τύχει να διαχειριστείς ένα τόσο μεγάλο ζήτημα γνώσης; Ελάχιστες.

Τώρα είμαστε στις αρχές του 21ο αιώνα. Ελπίζω να έχετε γίνει ποιο μεθοδικοί και ποιο έξυπνοι.

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Τον Klaus Fuchs τον σέβομαι, διότι έγινε κατάσκοπος λόγο ιδεολογίας. Δε το έκανε για το χρήμα. Η απόφαση του να προδώσει, προηλθε από τη ζωή του στο παρελθόν και την αντίληψη του για το μέλλον. Ήθελε μια ισορροπία, σε έναν βίαιο κόσμο.

Ο Χίτλερ και οι Ναζί έφεραν την Βία σε πρώτο πλάνο και σε μαζική κλίμακα.

Ο Klaus Fuchs φοιτητής ακόμα άνηκε στον χώρο της Αριστεράς. Πρώτα γράφτηκε στο SPD και αργότερα στο Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα. Φυσικά οι Ναζί τον κυνήγησαν.

Ο Klaus Fuchs ήταν στρατευμένος Κομμουνιστής. Αν κάποιος στο FBI έψαχνε το παρελθόν του, θα το είχε δει. Δεν ήταν κάτι κρυφό.

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Η Ιστορία γράφεται από πρόσωπα. Σας το έχω ξαναγράψει.

Η περίπτωση του Klaus Fuchs μας δίνει ένα τρανό παράδειγμα.

Οι πληροφορίες που έδωσε, ήταν καταλύτης.

Επίσης αν και στρατευμένος αριστερός, αυτός προσπάθησε και τελικά ήρθε σε επαφή με τους Σοβιετικούς και όχι εκείνοι! Εκπληκτικό έτσι;  Μάλιστα το έκανε και άγαρμπα. Δεν κρύφτηκε και πολύ, μέχρι να έρθει, να βρει, κάποια επαφή.

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Τα ζητήματα ασφαλείας πάντα είναι δύσκολα. Δύσκολα Ερώτημα, δύσκολες απαντήσεις.

Αυτό προϋποθέτει καλά μυαλά.

Αν το Manhattan Project ήταν ένα κολοσσιαίο πρόγραμμα γνώσης και η ασφάλεια του, ήταν εξίσου κολοσσιαία επιχείρηση, που έπρεπε να δουλέψουν τα καλύτερα μυαλά.

Ενώ το Manhattan Project επέτυχε, η ασφάλεια του απέτυχε. Οικτρά.

Για να διαχειριστείς τέτοια προγράμματα πρέπει να είσαι σε θέση να κάνεις τεράστιες αναλύσεις και συνθέσεις, να έχεις και τις υποδομές. Θέλει ευφυΐα.

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http://io9.com/klaus-fuchs/

Klaus Fuchs was just one of the many eccentrics chosen to work on the Manhattan Project. People remembered him as being serious, quiet, and earnest. He was also a spy — whose eventual capture lead to both the Red Scare and the arrest of the Rosenbergs.

Learn the strange history of the atomic spy – and how Richard Feynman was mixed up in it.

When choosing scientists for the Manhattan Project, the organizers of the project were in a bind. They were up against an enemy who had captured supplies of many of the materials necessary to make a bomb, that had been a Mecca for brilliant physicists before the war, and that still retained a great deal of talent. They were making a huge investment of time and money during a period where every dollar and second counted. They needed the best talent. But they also needed to think about security.

“The best talent” was often paired with idiosyncratic politics and personalities.

For example, Richard Feynman, though not disloyal, had a disregard for security protocol, and at times had a love of breaking into places just to show that he could.

This was a headache, and a worry, for the military. In fact, it had got around the facility that Richard Feynman had sat up one night drinking with another scientist, and had loudly announced that clearly, he was the person in the room most likely to be a spy.

Feynman, for once, was wrong. It was the other scientist who was the spy. Klaus Fuchs was a serious and quiet man, who had studied graduate level physics at Edinburgh University.

He was a German who had even been placed briefly in an internment camp by the British government — but he wasn’t likely to have been a Nazi spy. He had fled Germany to get away from the Nazis, and his stay in the camp was cut short when his teachers went en masse to the British government and pleaded for his release.

On the strength of their say-so, and on his stellar work in tube alloys as part of the war effort, he was assigned by the British to be one of their scientists working at Los Alamos on the Manhattan Project. The British hadn’t considered one thing when they made this decision. While there was no chance that he would spy for the Nazis, Fuchs had fled to Germany because he had been a communist.

Obviously there’s a difference in being a communist and spying on your country for a communist country. (We all learned that the hard way.)

But Fuchs had been a spy even when he was working on alloys. In a statement written after he was caught, he said that it seemed to him that England and America were keeping technological developments from Russia in the hopes that Russia and Germany would fight each other to the death by the end of the war, leaving the field clear for the rest of the Allies. Because of this, he felt that he was in the right to share all technological innovations made by some of the Allied forces among all the supposed allies. When he went to Los Alamos he worked on implosion mechanisms for the bomb, and turned over sketches of the Fat Man bomb to a courier for the Soviet Union.

His statement doesn’t entirely hold up, as he continued to spy for the Soviet Union well after the war ended.

It was only in 1949 that suspicion fell on him. Britain and the US launched the VENONA project, a codebreaking operation.

The Russian codes that had been used by agents during the war and afterwards were decrypted with special keys that were used only one time each.

When they were used that way, the codes were unbreakable. VENONA only managed to untangle the messages because the Soviets had the same problem as the Manhattan Project supervisors.

They had to balance a wartime need against the interests of security, and so occasionally re-used keys, or reproduced keys, in order to keep up with the demand. At first when VENONA officials found Fuchs’ reports, they hoped that someone in his office had stolen them. As more evidence piled up, they had to admit that that wasn’t the case.

They arrested Fuchs, who, facing the consequence of turning over nuclear secrets, was eager to inform on his fellow spies in order to make a deal.

He gave up his courier, Harry Gold, who, when he was arrested, gave up David Greenglass, another spy at Los Alamos. It was Greenglass who turned in Julius and Ethel Rosenberg.

They protested their innocence, and it was their trial, as well as the realization that the most guarded secret facility of World War II had had multiple spies working in it, that started the Red Scare. Fuchs’ own trial lasted all of 90 minutes, after which he was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment.

After serving just under ten, he was sent to East Germany, where he resumed his career — and some say he was instrumental in China developing the atom bomb. He died in 1988.

Via UMKC, Atomic Archive, PBS, Before the Fallout, and About.com.

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Αν ( IF ) τα ταξίδια στο χρόνο είναι δυνατά. Τότε ένας “ταξιδιώτης του Χρόνου” θα μπορούσε να δώσει την εντολή να σκοτώσουν τον Klaus Fuchs ή να τον συλλάβουν.

Η περίπτωση του Klaus Fuchs είναι εκπληκτική. Αν η Σοβιετική Ένωση δεν είχε την Ατομική Βόμβα το 1949 δε θα είχαμε πόλεμο στην Κορέα και πιθανότητα την Κρίση στην Κούβα το 1962.

Εδώ μιλάμε για πολύ σκληρή επιστήμη.

Όταν ανακατεύεις ταξίδια στο χρόνο, έχεις σκληρή επιστήμη και φυσικά δίνεις και απάντηση, αν το σύμπαν που ζούμε είναι το μοναδικό.

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http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/terrorists_spies/spies/fuchs/1.html

The First Atom Bomb

It was a bright sunny day in New Mexico, the sort of dry, hot day that is the hallmark of the American Southwest. The intense sun reflected off the light tan buildings, blinding anyone out in the noonday sun without sunglasses. On a small attractive bridge situated in the heart of Santa Fe, two men met. One was in short sleeves and khaki slacks, of average height, slim and somber, with steel-rimmed glasses and clip-on sunglasses. The other was short and dumpy, incongruously wearing a fedora and a raincoat. He was dressed inappropriately for the desert heat, and was squinting against the bright sun and its reflection off the bone-dry buildings.

They came together on the bridge, in full view of anyone who would care to glance their way.

No one noticed them they were merely two of the many strangers that had appeared in Santa Fe during the war years.

However, on this June day in 1945, this apparently innocent meeting was not a casual happenstance. The taller of the two men handed an envelope to the short, fat easterner.

It contained the principal elements of the design of the atomic bomb.

This was not the first time the two had met. Five or six times prior to the meeting on the bridge in Santa Fe, the taller man had given the shorter one envelopes containing scientific documents.

These other meetings had been in New York. Most of them were brief, lasting only a few minutes. The two men did not really know each other. The short man the courier was known to the taller man only as “Raymond.” In New York, four days after the meeting in Santa Fe, the courier delivered the envelope to his Russian contact, just as he had delivered similar packets of secrets after other meetings.

The detonation of the atomic bomb at
Trinity (CORIBS)

A month after the Santa Fe meeting, in July 1945, the Trinity Test the explosion of the first atomic bomb took place in the New Mexico desert. The taller man watched the momentous event from the bridge, five miles from the desert explosion. After all, he had a vested interest in this unique detonation. He had helped to make this new and terrible weapon. He watched as a column of orange fire blossomed into a huge, white mushroom cap. A month after that, in August, the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The nuclear age was now official and public.

Then, on September 23, 1949, four years and a month after Hiroshima, President Truman announced that the Soviet Union had detonated an atomic bomb.

The exclusive possession of the greatest weapon of mass destruction then known to man was no longer the sole province of the United States. The Cold War now had a new element the concept of shared mutual destruction.

How could this be? American scientists had assured the president and his advisers that Russia’s development of the atomic bomb was at least two years off, perhaps as many as five years in the future.

Could the Russians have been making more rapid scientific progress than we believed? More significantly, had they somehow stolen our secrets?

A few months after the Russians tested their atom bomb, a British physicist who had worked on the Manhattan Project the American atom bomb at Los Alamos, New Mexico, and who was now the assistant director of the British atom bomb project at Harwell in England confessed that he had indeed been passing atomic secrets to the Russians.

He was the taller man from the bridge.

Klaus Fuchs at Los
Alamos

His name was Klaus Emil Fuchs, and he was, as it has been shown by history, the most important atom spy in history.

Not any of the notorious names in the saga of the theft of the atom bomb secrets Allan Nunn May, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, and David Greenglass had been as important to the Russian effort as Klaus Fuchs.

Even the famous Cambridge University spies Philby, Burgess, Maclean, and Blunt had not done as much damage to American and British secrecy. Only a young American named Theodore Hall, working at Los Alamos during the same period, provided as much information as Fuchs, and then only to confirm what Fuchs had delivered to Raymond, the short courier.

Who was Klaus Fuchs? What motivated him to betray Britain, his adopted country and her allies? What exactly did he give the Russians? What makes up the personality and psyche of the greatest of the atom spies? How was he caught?

With the exception of the last of these questions how he was caught there are only partial answers. Fuchs was, as Winston Churchill said of the Soviet Union, “an enigma wrapped in a mystery.”

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http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Klaus_Fuchs.aspx

Klaus Fuchs

The German-born physicist Klaus Fuchs (1911-1988) was one of the Soviet Union’s most effective spies operating in Britain and the United States in the critical period during and after World War II.

Fuchs revealed the American designs for the atomic bomb to a Soviet spy shortly after they were drawn up, and he passed along information about the nascent hydrogen bomb as well. He is thought to have speeded construction of a Soviet nuclear device by perhaps three years. Fuchs’s eventual exposure was the first in a long line of incidents that revealed grave flaws in Britain’s national security apparatus, and his story, which reads in places like a spy thriller, bears on the difficulty of combating the nuclear proliferation in the world today.

Of Quaker Background

Klaus Emil Julius Fuchs was born on December 29, 1911, in Rüsselsheim, Germany, near Darmstadt in the German state of Hesse.

He was influenced heavily by his father, Emil, a Quaker minister with a strong socialist and idealist orientation that he impressed upon all his children. When the family later moved to the city of Kiel they became known as the Red Foxes of Kiel, both for their red hair and their leftwing philosophies (the name Fuchs means “Fox” in German). Fuchs became interested in politics as a student at the University of Leipzig in 1930.

He joined the socialist Social Democratic Party but was disillusioned after that party made accommodations with conservatives in the maneuvering that accompanied Adolf Hitler’s rise, and his politics moved leftward. At the University of Kiel he joined the Communist Party of Germany, which he and many other leftist Germans felt represented the last bastion of resistance to Hitler.

Conditions for Fuchs and his family deteriorated rapidly as the Nazis’ grip on Germany tightened, and harassment caused Fuchs’s mother to commit suicide. Fuchs and his siblings scattered, and Fuchs decided to leave Germany. In September of 1933 he arrived in England. By that time he was a committed Communist who took orders from the Communist Party in Moscow, and he left Germany only to escape persecution. “I was sent out by the Party,” he was quoted as saying by biographer Robert Chadwell Williams in Klaus Fuchs: Atom Spy. “They said that I must finish my studies because after the revolution in Germany people would be required with technical knowledge to take part in the building up of the Communist Germany.”

Fuchs took his instructions seriously.

He enrolled in a Ph.D. program at the University of Bristol, receiving his degree in 1936 after writing a thesis titled “The Cohesive Forces of Copper and the Elastic Constants of Monovalent Metals.”

His Communist leanings were noted by British officials, but in 1930s Britain, with many Britons viewing the Soviet Union as a bulwark against German fascism, his political positions were not thought to represent a significant threat.

Fuchs moved on to the University of Edinburgh and continued to do physics research. Supporting himself on a fellowship stipend, he published a series of articles in 1939 and 1940 dealing with electromagnetic radiation and wave functions.

After war broke out, Fuchs fell under more suspicion because he was German than because he was a Communist. In 1940 he was questioned in Edinburgh, arrested, and sent to an internment camp run by the Canadian army near Quebec City, Quebec. Later he was transferred to another Quebec camp near Sherbrooke. Conditions were difficult in these camps; in the Sherbrooke facility, only five faucets and six latrines were provided for the 720 prisoners. However, Fuchs and other prisoners organized a camp university at which he gave physics lectures.

Fuchs was released from the internment camp and taken back to Britain at the behest of two British scientists: Max Born, his former advisor in Edinburgh, and Rudolf Peierls, a scientist working on Britain’s atomic research program centered at Birmingham University.

Their intercession was successful because Fuchs was on a list of scientists wanted for work on Britain’s atomic bomb enterprise, which was code-named the Tube Alloys project.

Contacted Soviet Embassy

According to John Crossland of the Times of London, an MI5 security service agent named Griffiths wrote to his superiors: “If anything very serious against Fuchs should come to light we could consider the cancellation of his permit. In the meantime perhaps it would be as well to warn the Ministry of Atomic Production of this man’s communist connexions.” Although disregarded owing to the growing alliance between Britain and the Soviet Union, the warning was a pertinent one. Fuchs quickly made contact with the Soviet Embassy in London and informed personnel there that he had been assigned to sensitive atomic work. They placed him in contact with a female Soviet military intelligence agent, Ruth Beurton, code-named Sonia.

Fuchs became a naturalized British citizen in 1942, enhancing his security credentials despite continuing misgivings from British intelligence agencies.

His value as a Soviet resource increased dramatically in 1943 when he became one of a group of British scientists chosen to join the U.S. atomic bomb project in Los Alamos, New Mexico, known as the Manhattan Project.

Soviet intelligence had its own code name for the project, “Enormoz,” and Fuchs was referred to as agent Charles.

Fuchs made important contributions to the atomic bomb as it developed, focusing on detonation devices, and he was present at the Trinity test, the world’s first test of a nuclear weapon, on July 16, 1945. He had close working relationships with Edward Teller and other designers of American nuclear weaponry.

Fuchs’s contact in America was a Soviet spy named Harry Gold, whom he knew as Raymond.

Their initial meeting took place in New York City, where Fuchs arrived before traveling to New Mexico.

They agreed to meet on a Saturday afternoon, identifying each other as follows: Gold carried a pair of gloves and a green-covered book, and Fuchs carried a handball. Subsequent meetings after Fuchs went to Los Alamos were often accomplished during Fuchs’s vacation time, with his sister Kristel, who lived in Cambridge, Massachusetts, sometimes serving as intermediary. Fuchs passed along detailed drawings of American nuclear weapon designs, enabling the Soviet Union to build its own atomic bomb well in advance of the timeline its own capabilities would have permitted.

In 1946 Fuchs returned to Britain and was assigned to the Harwell Atomic Research Establishment as senior principal scientific officer. He continued to meet with Sonia and other Soviet handlers, using as rendezvous points a country road and a south London pub called the Spotted Horse.

Fuchs was instructed to leave chalk marks on a sidewalk near a railway station to confirm a meeting, and for emergency meetings he was supposed to throw a copy of the magazine Men Only into the garden of a specific house. During this period he transmitted to Soviet intelligence what he knew of the incipient hydrogen bomb, which he had heard Teller discuss. Fuchs’s hydrogen bomb information is thought to have been less useful than the materials he passed along about the atomic bomb, as the eventual hydrogen bomb tested by the Americans was based on a design that was different from the ones developed while Fuchs was in Los Alamos. He did help the Soviets keep abreast of developments in the American hydrogen bomb program.

Experienced “Controlled Schizophrenia”

Fuchs did all this because he was devoted to the Soviet Union and its aims.

The stress of leading a double life began to take its toll on him, however, and he was troubled by the increasing brutality of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin’s reign in the late 1940s. “I used my Marxist philosophy to establish in my mind two separate compartments,” he said in his eventual confession, as quoted by Williams. One compartment was the sphere of his British identity “in which I allowed myself to make friendships, to have personal relations, to help people and to be in all personal ways the kind of man I wanted to be.” The other compartment contained his status as a loyal Communist. “It appeared to me at the time that I had become a ‘free man’ because I had succeeded in the other compartment to establish myself completely independent of the surrounding forces of society. Looking back at it now the best way of expressing it seems to be to call it a controlled schizophrenia.”

In 1949, in poor health and with these questions weighing on his mind, Fuchs made a fatal mistake. He was already under close surveillance as a possible source of unexplained leaks of information on Britain’s nuclear program. His father, Emil, had moved to Communist East Germany, and Fuchs reported this fact to Harwell security officers, warning that the Soviets might use that information to try to blackmail him. He was subsequently questioned by MI5 investigator Jim Skardon. Fuchs initially denied knowledge of the leaks, but on January 24, 1950, he asked Skardon to meet for lunch at a pub near the Harwell establishment. Skardon noted that Fuchs seemed to be under a good deal of stress, and Fuchs began to lay out his story. Curiously, Fuchs believed that he would still be able to maintain his position at Harwell.

Fuchs was put on trial and convicted of espionage. On March 1, 1950, he was sentenced to 14 years at the Old Bailey prison, a sentence lightened by the fact that Britain and the Soviet Union had been allies during the time most of the crimes had been committed. Fuchs was a model prisoner who taught classes and wrote articles for the Old Bailey prison magazine. He was released after nine years, in 1959, for good behavior and was deported to East Germany.

A few days after his arrival there he married Greta Keilson, whom he had met in France in the 1930s. Fuchs became a member of the Central Committee of the East German Communist Party and served until 1979 as deputy director of the country’s nuclear research institute. He died in East Berlin on January 28, 1988.

Books

The Cold War, 1945-1991, 3 vols., edited by Benjamin Frankel, Gale Research, 1992.

Moss, Norman, Klaus Fuchs: The Man Who Stole the Atom Bomb, Grafton, 1987.

Williams, Robert Chadwell, Klaus Fuchs: Atom Spy, Harvard University Press, 1987.

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BLOOMBERG PRINTER 3D FIRST STORE 01 280912

Πως διαχειρίζεσαι την γνώση; Την κρύβεις ή την αφήνεις ελεύθερη σε ένα καλό περιβάλλον να βλαστήσει και να δώσει καρπούς;

Αυτά είναι ερωτήματα εξουσίας.

Κλασικό παράδειγμα οι Η/Υ. Οι Αμερικανοί έδωσαν μια ελευθερία, σε αντίθεση με τους Άγγλους. Κέρδισαν οι Αμερικανοί.

Βέβαια δεν είναι τόσο απλό όσο το γράφω. Αλλά πιστεύω να πήρατε μια ιδέα.

Ο Steve Jobs πήγε στην Xerox και εκεί είδε το μέλλον. Ο Bill Gates πηγε στον Steve Jobs και είδε και αυτός το μέλλον. Έχουμε δηλαδή μια αλληλεπίδραση της ελεύθερης μετακίνησης και της σύνθεσης.

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Ο Klaus Fuchs έκλεψε τα μυστικά της Ατομικής Βόμβας, αλλά τελικά στην κούρσα της επικράτησης, η Σοβιετική Ένωση έχασε.

Ο Klaus Fuchs στο τέλος της ζωής του – 1988 – θα αναρωτιόταν αν έκανε σωστά. Ο Σοβιετικός Κομμουνισμός αποδείχτηκε το ίδιο αισχρός με τους Ναζί.

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Αν ( IF ) το Σύμπαν που ζούμε, δεν είναι το μοναδικό, τι σημαίνει, η εκπληκτική περίπτωση του Klaus Fuchs;

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http://www.undergroundumbrella.co.uk/bookshelf_095.html

Chapter One

In the spring of 1942 the war in Russia was nearing the end of its first year. The savage Russian resistance and the equally savage Russian winter had dashed Hitler’s hopes of a quick blitzkrieg victory over the Soviet Union to follow those in the West, and littered the landscape with the frozen wrecks of thousands of German tanks, trucks and artillery pieces, and the frozen bodies of tens of thousands of German soldiers. The invaders were being pushed back from the approaches to Moscow, and war was raging along a 4,500-mile front. Now Soviet armies were girding themselves to meet the next German offensive, and the Soviet Government was mobilising industry and population for a prolonged and bitter struggle that would tax the nation’s resources to the utmost.

One day in April, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, called the Minister for the Chemical Industry, Mikhail Pervukhin, into his office. He handed Pervukhin a file containing intelligence reports of work that was going on in secret in Western countries on a new kind of weapon, a uranium bomb, that would explode by releasing the energy locked inside the atom. Molotov said he was giving him this file on the instructions of Stalin himself. He told Pervukhin to consult scientists knowledgeable in this field, and determine what action, if any, should be taken in the light of these reports.

Pervukhin did so. Soviet atomic physicists, like their counterparts elsewhere, were aware by now that the creation of an explosion by atomic fission was theoretically possible. The reports in this file showed that it was a practical possibility as well. The scientists gave their advice, and Pervukhin reported to Stalin. Within months a laboratory was set up to work on atomic fission, scientists were taken off other war work to staff it, and the Soviet atomic bomb programme was under way.

The principal contributor to these files, sending back reports via a Soviet agent in Britain, was a pale, bespectacled, unusually taciturn physicist who had been brought up always to do what his conscience told him to, Klaus Fuchs.

A little while after this, in the summer of 1944, on a Saturday afternoon, Klaus Fuchs was driving through Santa Fe, New Mexico. He had on the seat beside him a large envelope containing data on the atomic bomb that was being built in secret at Los Alamos, some thirty miles from the city. This project was the best-kept secret of the war, and the most important secret in the world. But the envelope he had with him was a virtual information pack on the bomb, containing descriptions, calculations, figures, and even a scale drawing.

Fuchs stopped the car on an avenue with overhanging trees that provided some shade from the burning south-western sun, and looked around for a familiar figure. He saw him almost at once, a medium-built, pudgy-faced man with thick glasses. The man got into the car, and Fuchs drove a short distance and parked, and the two of them talked. Then Fuchs handed the man the envelope; he got out and walked away, and Fuchs drove off. The man went to the bus station, to wait for the next bus to Albuquerque, where he was to make a call the next day on a US army sergeant.

If ever a man was his father’s son, it was Klaus Fuchs. This is not to say that he was just like his father, for they followed very different careers, and Fuchs senior had some qualities which his son Klaus conspicuously lacked. But the mainsprings of Klaus Fuchs’s actions can be seen in his father’s life and deepest beliefs.

Emil Fuchs was a clergyman in the Lutheran Church, the church that claims direct descent from the man who most effectively raised the banner of individual conscience against the claims to spiritual authority of the Roman Catholic Church. Indeed, the principles that Klaus Fuchs followed, and his justification to himself for betraying his oath of allegiance to his adopted country, can be traced right back to Martin Luther’s famous statement of defiance to the Diet of Worms in 1521: ‘I do not accept the authority of popes and councils. . . My conscience is captive to the word of God.’

The mainstream of the Lutheran Church has always taken good care to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s; it has accepted the temporal authority of the state, as Luther himself did, and has tended to be conservative. Emil Fuchs was one of a radical minority, ready to challenge injustices perpetrated by the state in the name of Christian values. He was a Socialist for most of his life, and a brave opponent of Nazism.

Like Luther, like the heroes of Protestantism, he was ready to follow the dictates of his conscience whatever others said, and whatever the consequences. His moral priorities are seen in a passage in a pamphlet he wrote, Christ in Catastrophe, recalling some of his fears as the father of a family during the early Hitler years: ‘People who fell into Nazi hands were treated with great cruelty, and I was in great anxiety. One night I nearly went mad. I saw my children cruelly killed, lying before me, and in this hour of utter despair, I heard a voice saying: “What do you want? Shall they keep their lives by losing their conscience?” Peace came to me.’

His religious beliefs changed during the course of his life. He wrote later of ‘spiritual struggle’, and ‘wrestling with questions’. This kind of travail is inherent in the Protestant doctrine, and accounts of tormenting inner struggles run through the writings of the great figures of Protestantism, including Luther himself. For if one has to find the answer to moral and spiritual questions in oneself rather than in any outside authority, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the voice of God from that of the Devil, of true morality from proud error. A battle rages inside the head. It raged inside his, and it was to rage inside his son’s.

As a young clergyman, Emil Fuchs went to Manchester to be the pastor to a German congregation there . . .   

Klaus Fuchs : The Man Who Stole the Atom Bomb

From the dust-jacket:

‘In the summer of 1944, on a Saturday afternoon, Klaus Fuchs was driving through Santa Fe, New Mexico. He had on the seat beside him a large envelope containing data on the atomic bomb that was being built in secret at Los Alamos, some thirty miles from the city. This project was the best-kept secret of the war, and the most important secret in the world. But the envelope he had with him was a virtual information pack on the bomb, containing descriptions, calculations, figures, and even a scale drawing.

‘Fuchs stopped the car on an avenue with overhanging trees that provided some shade from the burning south-western sun, and looked around for a familiar figure. He saw him almost at once, a medium-built, pudgy-faced man with thick glasses. The man got into the car, and Fuchs drove a short distance and parked, and the two of them talked. Then Fuchs handed the man the envelope; he got out and walked away, and Fuchs drove off…’

‘It is hardly an exaggeration to say that Klaus Fuchs alone has influenced the safety of more people and accomplished greater damage than any other spy … in the history of nations.’ Thus said a US Congressional report.

Fuchs’s story is one of espionage and conscience, politics and morality. He came to Britain as a young refugee from Nazism, a quiet, introverted, brilliant physics student, who concealed his Communist convictions. He worked at Bristol and Edinburgh Universities, and was recruited into the secret atom bomb project. In Britain and later in the United States, he gave Soviet agents information that spurred Russia on to start its own atom bomb project and helped that project to fruition. He acted always according to the dictates of his conscience, but by the time he was arrested, in London in 1950, he had come to question these dictates. He lives today in East Germany.

Norman Moss gives us a searching and memorable picture of Fuchs and his world, his role in the most momentous historical development of this century, his contacts with the Soviet Intelligence apparatus, his friendships, the twists and turns of his mind and his conscience that led to a series of strange confrontations with his accusers, and the Intelligence work that led to his arrest. Fuchs’s dilemmas reflect fundamental moral and political conflicts of our time.

Moss has interviewed many friends and colleagues of Fuchs and others involved in his story in several countries, and has also drawn on hitherto secret documents which he obtained from US Government files under the Freedom of Information Act. These include Fuchs’s full confession, which has never been published before.
Norman Moss is a writer, journalist and broadcaster. He is British, but was brought up partly in the United States. He has worked for Reuters, the Associated Press and the Sunday Times, and was foreign correspondent of an American radio network. He has written for leading British and American newspapers and magazines.

He is author of Men Who Play God: the Story of the Hydrogen Bomb; A British/American Dictionary: The Pleasures of Deception; and The Politics of Uranium. A BBC radio programme about Klaus Fuchs that he wrote and presented was described by the Observer critic as ‘the best espionage programme I have ever heard’.

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http://yalebooks.co.uk/display.asp?K=9780300177572

In the history of Soviet espionage in America, few people figure more crucially than Harry Gold. A Russian Jewish immigrant who spied for the Soviets from 1935 until 1950, Gold was an accomplished industrial and military espionage agent. He was assigned to be physicist Klaus Fuchs’ ‘handler’ and ultimately conveyed sheaves of stolen information about the Manhattan Project from Los Alamos to Russian agents. He is literally the man who gave the USSR the plans for the atom bomb. The subject of the most intensive public manhunt in the history of the FBI, Gold was arrested in May 1950. Gold’s confession revealed scores of contacts, and his testimony in the trial of the Rosenbergs proved pivotal. Yet among his co-workers, fellow prisoners at Lewisburg Penitentiary, and even those in the FBI, Gold earned respect, admiration, and affection. In “The Invisible Harry Gold”, journalist and historian Allen Hornblum paints a surprising portrait of this notorious yet unknown figure. Through interviews with many individuals who knew Gold and years of research into primary documents, Hornblum has produced a gripping account of how a fundamentally decent and well-intentioned man helped commit the greatest scientific theft of the twentieth century.

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Οι Μπιτλς ήταν μια Ατομική Βόμβα. Σκέψου να είσαι στο Σοβιετικό Στρατόπεδο και να ακούς αυτό το τραγούδι; Απλά σκέψου.

Να είσαι νέος και να ακούς αυτό το τραγούδι.

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Αυτή η φωτογραφία μας λέει πολλά. Η Γερμανία ήταν την εποχή εκείνη η κοιτίδα της πυρηνικής φυσικής. Αν στοιχημάτιζε κάποιος, σίγουρα θα στοιχημάτιζε στην Γερμανία για την κατασκευή της πρώτης Ατομικής Βόμβας. Ήταν το φαβορί.

Το ενδιαφέρον της ιστορίας, είναι πως «έσπασε αυτή η φωτογραφία».

Η φωτογραφία έσπασε και τα άτομα αυτά διασκορπίστηκαν για να μαζευτούν πάλι στην Αμερική.

Τώρα θα μου πεις εσύ αναγνώστη, τι καταλαβαίνεις από αυτά. Η απάντηση είναι απλή: οι περισσότεροι δεν καταλαβαίνεται τίποτα. Από δημιουργική ευχαρίστηση το γράφω.

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http://highlandcoldwar8.wikispaces.com/The+Testing+of+Nuclear+Power-P5

The Testing of Nuclear Power
Report by Ty

The testing of the nuclear bomb was an important time in the history of the world. It began a new era of warfare, making most weapons obsolete. Every country raced to get the most nuclear weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union led the race.

Scientists learned a lot about the shape of the atom during the late 1800’s and the early 1900’s. In 1938, scientists discovered that splitting the nucleus of a uranium atom released a lot of energy. Those scientists began to think about the applications of using this for power like electricity.

By early 1939, close to the start of World War II, the United States became aware of the military applications of nuclear energy. They were worried that Nazi Germany might develop and then drop an atomic bomb on us. The Manhattan Project was developed to create a nuclear fission bomb.

On July 16, 1945, the Manhattan Project’s team of scientists, led by the American physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, exploded the first experimental nuclear bomb. It was a 22-kiloton implosion type fission bomb. Implosion is a better way to make an atomic bomb, with plutonium and highly explosive lenses. The test was near Alamogordo, New Mexico, and it convinced U.S. leaders that nuclear weapons were possible.

This was important, because it led to the end of the war in the Pacific. It also showed humans what horrible things we can do to one another. The race for nuclear arms, or the Cold War, began as soon as we dropped the bombs on Japan. The decades after were changed, as everyone tried to create a nuclear weapon. Many countries now have nuclear bombs, and the threat is bigger now than it has ever been.

The Manhattan Project conducted the testing of the atomic bomb. The names of the people that worked on this project were Luis W. Alvarez, Kenneth Bainbridge, Hans Bethe, Felix Bloch, Aage N. Bohr, Niels Bohr, Gregory Breit,Vannevar Bush, Walter S. Carpenter, Jr., James Chadwick, Owen Chamberlain, Arthur H. Compton, Richard Feynman, Val Fitch, Otto Robert Frisch, Klaus Fuchs, Samuel Goudsmit, Gordon Gould, David Greenglass, Leslie R. Groves, Jerome Karle, Ernest Lawrence, Edwin M. McMillan, Frank Oppenheimer, Rudolf Peireirls, Isidor Isaac Rabi, Norman F. Ramsey, Joseph Rotblat, Glenn Seaborg, Emilio Segre, William Shurcliff, Henry L. Stimson, Leo Szilard Edward Teller, Paul Tibbets, Harold C. Urey, John von Meumann, Victor Weisskopf, Eugene Wigner, and Maurice Wilkins.

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Posted December 17, 2012 by bmplefour in Uncategorized

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